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Abstract 
 
 To what extent is individual opposition to public health regulations consistent 
across different types of regulations across the public sphere? Does a person’ policy 
stance vary depending on the issue at hand? Do other determinants have a measureable 
influence? In order to answer these questions, data were collected via a web-based survey 
completed by 284 undergraduate students at the University of Arkansas. Respondents 
were asked about their concerns regarding public health issues such as smoking and 
secondhand smoke exposure, as well as obesity, alcohol abuse, and seatbelt usage. The 
findings are that individual opposition to public health regulations can be consistent 
depending upon certain determinants, including personal behavior, perception of liberty, 
public health consciousness, and risk perception. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Over the course of the United States’ history, many regulations aiming to promote 
the public health have been enacted at the local, state, and federal levels of government. 
Generally meeting with success, those regulations have in part led to a dramatic increase 
in average life expectancy at birth for both sexes from 47.3 years in 1900 to 78.7 years in 
2010 (USDHHS 2014a, 80). However, other Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development countries have also steadily outpaced the United States in that same 
category at least since 1980 (82). While this may be attributed in part to healthcare access 
and quality, among other things, the compounded effect of unhealthy personal behaviors 
must also be taken into account. As will be shown, efforts to regulate unhealthy personal 
behaviors such as smoking, diet, alcohol abuse, and seatbelt usage, to name but a few, 
have been successful during the last several decades. In some instances, opposition to 
those regulations has been relatively unpronounced. In others, it has been vehement. 
The impetus for this study was a proposed amendment to Fayetteville, Arkansas’ 
Municipal Code § 95.05 (2003) that would have revoked the exemption status of bars 
located within city limits from the now statewide prohibition on indoor public smoking. 
Tobacco shops are the only other businesses that currently enjoy the privilege of being 
able to allow indoor public smoking. There is no doubt that the Fayetteville City Council 
has the authority to promulgate a smoking ban in bars, for the Arkansas Clean Indoor Air 
Act of 2006 “is cumulative to and does not prohibit the enactment of . . . local ordinances 
prohibiting smoking that are more restrictive.”1 Nevertheless, during the ensuing public 
                                                
1 Ark. Code Ann. § 20-27-1808(a). 
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debate, many Fayettevillians spoke out against the amendment, focusing primarily on the 
debate over liberty versus the public health (Fayetteville 2011, 28). It was therefore not a 
question of whether that particular personal behavior could be regulated, but whether it 
ought to be regulated. 
 Still, such a question merely brings more questions to the forefront. When the 
detrimental health effects of secondhand smoke have been so well documented, why are 
so many people opposed to a policy measure that would curb those effects? Do those who 
oppose such regulations do so because those regulations conflict with the individual’s 
fundamental belief in the importance of personal liberty? Conversely, could an 
individual’s opposition merely stem from more subtle factors, such as being a post-hoc 
justification for personal behavior or their perceptions of and aversion to risk? Is support 
a product of public health consciousness? What role might other explanations play, such 
as a person’s political ideology or party identification? Finally, from a broader 
prospective, how do those factors apply to other issues? Is opposition to public health 
regulations consistent across different types of regulations across the public sphere, or 
does it vary depending on the issue at hand? 
 This is a preliminary study intended to spur further scholarly research, allowing 
for such a wide array of questions to be hypothesized. Salient issues, including smoking 
and secondhand smoke exposure, obesity, alcohol abuses, and seatbelt usage, will be used 
to measure levels of support for public health regulations. The relationship between those 
policy stances and six influential determinants will be tested. Those determinants include 
personal behavior, perception of liberty, public consciousness, political ideology, party 
identification, and risk perception. Data collected via a methodically developed and 
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distributed survey will then be presented and analyzed extensively. The object is to 
establish lines of inquiry and ultimately to assist in the development of more effective 
policies that promote the public health through a pragmatic approach. 
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Chapter 2: Forming Policy Stances 
 
The Relationship Between Public Opinion and Public Policy 
Even if more effective policies are discovered, substantial public support is often required 
to realize them. To be sure, Americans in general are apathetic about many issues, and 
many policies have been promulgated with relatively little input. Nonetheless, empirical 
studies have consistently measured a clear congruence between opinion and policy on 
salient issues (see, e.g., Erikson 1976; Weissberg 1976; Monroe 1978; Page and Shapiro 
1983; Dahl 1989; Smith 2000; Burstein 2003). Given the amount of public outcry 
concerning the issues included in this study, they must be included among the most 
salient. Therefore, it seems that measures such as the proposed Fayetteville amendment 
will likely continue to be difficult to achieve without substantial public support. 
 Some scholars, however, have attempted to minimize the influence of public 
opinion to near negligibility (see, e.g., Block 1987; Domhoff 1998). Although, as Paul 
Burstein (2003, 29) points out, even “those whose theories attribute little power to the 
public concede that governments sometimes follow public opinion.” But if government 
only sometimes follows public opinion, what is it following the rest of the time? Several 
studies have attempted to measure the relationship between opinion and policy in view of 
factors such as interest group activity, political party involvement, and influence by 
elites, but they have found that, controlling for these factors, public opinion remains 
influential (see, e.g., Smith 1999; Burstein 2003). That is not to say that opinion and 
policy always align when issues are salient—government does enact measures to which 
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the public is opposed—that is to agree with Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro’s (1983, 
189) assessment that opinion and policy align more often than not. 
 
Decision-Making Processes 
Accepting the premise that there is a relationship between opinion and policy, it is now 
left to discover what shapes individual opinions and policy stances. Angus Campbell et 
al. (1960) touched off an era of behavioral studies of the American electorate in their 
groundbreaking work, The American Voter. Based primarily on data from the 1952 and 
1956 presidential elections, the conclusions drawn therein were limited in scope, 
especially considering the mass realignment of political party loyalties that would follow 
in the in the politically turbulent decades to come. Central to the conclusions in what is 
also known as the Michigan school of thought is that, more often than not, American 
voters are irrational actors, basing their decisions on inherited ideas of partisanship rather 
than making decisions in their own self-interest. From this it can be inferred that a 
person’s party identification is the key determinant their own political opinions on 
specific issues. 
 V. O. Key, Jr. begged to differ in his 1966 work, The Responsible Electorate. 
Utilizing much of the same data, Key does confirm the significance of the Michigan 
model based on party identification, but ultimately draws different conclusions; namely, 
that “voters are not fools” (1966, 7). According to Key, most Americans are in fact 
rational actors. For them, while they often do vote according to party identification, that 
identification is informed by policy stance more than vice versa. In other words, although 
some Americans do toe the party line no matter their policy stances, many more strive for 
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consistency, and “[t]hose whose policy preference conflicts with their party voting record 
are most likely to defect” (150). This suggests that an individual’s policy stances are not 
merely dictated by their party identification, but that, at least on an individual level, it is 
party identification that is informed by policy stances. 
 A decade after Key’s final academic effort was published posthumously, Norman 
Nie, Sidney Verba, and John Petrocik (NVP) published The Changing American Voter 
(1976), with an enlarged edition to follow (1979). It was yet another direct response to 
the Michigan school, but incorporated aspects of Key as well. Rather than refute either of 
their predecessors’ work, NVP expanded them both to the point of reconciliation. They 
found that voting patterns of the 1950s and early 1960s did resemble the partisan divide 
as a result of policy stances built upon lingering New Deal coalition loyalties, which 
explains why party identification was seemingly the source of public opinion. NVP were 
also able to witness the cultural explosion that ran from the early 1960s to the early 
1970s, and the subsequent changes in voting behavior that followed. From their 
perspective in the late 1970s, the American electorate had become less partisan, more 
individualistic, and more frequently engaged in issue voting. Eventually, depending on 
the issue, NVP found that Americans’ policy stances had more to do with whether one 
identified as a conservative or liberal rather than as Democrat or Republican, suggesting a 
relationship between political ideology and public opinion. 
 The Changing American Voter offered more than just a contemporary 
observation, however. NVP discovered quite rightly that the decision-making processes 
of American voters can be both rational and irrational, can change over time due to a 
myriad of factors, and that while none of those factors are mutually exclusive, some are 
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more prevalent than others depending on the issue at hand and the present circumstances. 
Even more variations abound. Warren Miller and J. Merrill Shanks updated the argument 
in The New American Voter (1996, vii) by incorporating many of the leading theories that 
had developed during the preceding two decades, ultimately finding that, “[t]hese varied 
sources of information and insight . . . have neither rested on nor produced an integrated 
or unified body of theory from which specific hypotheses can be derived.” 
 
Specific Determinants 
Unfortunately, the present study cannot examine how public opinion is formed through 
the lens of each decision-making theoretical variation, and, moreover, must be confined 
to only a few determinants, all for the sake of both brevity and efficacy. A couple of 
them, party identification and political ideology, namely, have been discussed in part. 
Their impact on public opinion will be elaborated upon further. Perceptions of liberty and 
risk will be examined as well. 
 
Party Identification. As aforementioned, party identification may have an impact on 
public opinion under the right conditions. Those conditions were present throughout 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s tenure as President of the United States from 1933 to 1945, 
when the country faced two overlapping international crises: the Great Depression and 
World War II. Prevailing despite unprecedented adversity, that Democrats enjoyed the 
loyalty of the New Deal coalition well into the 1960s (and perhaps to some extent the 
1970s) comes as no surprise. Campbell et al.’s (1960) findings reflected an American 
electorate that trusted partisan elites.  
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 Of course, the eventual collapse of the New Deal coalition, as well as the Civil 
Rights Movement, the Vietnam War, and the Watergate scandal eroded that trust 
throughout the remainder of the 1960s and into the 1970s. Party identification’s impact 
on public opinion eroded with it as Key (1966) and NVP (1979) found (see also, e.g., 
Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). However, as the next few decades saw the completion of 
party realignment, new conditions gave rise to partisan influence on public opinion once 
again, albeit drastically different than before.  
 Rather than a single dominant party, or two enfeebled parties, studies have shown 
increasing party polarization since the end of the Reagan administration (see, e.g., 
McCarty, Pool, and Rosenthal 2006; Dodson 2010). This has resulted in increased 
partisan sway on public opinion, but only within each party’s sphere of influence. James 
Druckman and Rune Slothuus (2012) found that as party polarization among elites 
increased, so did mass support for party platforms, and that substantive information had 
less influence than before. Kara Lindaman and Donald P. Haider-Markel (2002) also 
found that party elites influence opinion among their party members, especially salient 
issues like those relating to the culture wars. Currently, party polarization continues to 
increase, but not without complications. The rise of the Tea Party caucus within the 
Republican Party has proved the most enduring, but data on their long-term impact on 
partisan influence of public opinion is not yet forthcoming. 
  
Political Ideology. NVP did find as late as 1979 that Americans’ policy stances were 
increasingly based on political ideology more than party identification. Stanley Feldman 
(1988) also found that policy stances are linked to underlying, basic beliefs that inform 
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political ideology. Both of those assessments were probably true at the time of their 
publication, but NVP’s observation that the American electorate is ever in flux alludes to 
an eventual change in either those attitudes or at least how those attitudes are applied.   
 That change came in the form of emergent two-dimensional ideologies based on 
issue type (social and economic) and philosophy (conservative, moderate, and liberal), 
resulting in at least seven basic ideology types and all the subtle variations in between 
(see, e.g., Shafer and Claggett 1995; Treier and Hillygus 2009).2 Those ideological types 
remain accurate indicators of policy stances. Shawn Treier and D. Sunshine Hillygus 
(2009, 679-80) did go one step further and differentiated between the American 
electorate in general and political elites, finding that the latter’s policy stances can still be 
measured in the one-dimensional ideological terms of conservative and liberal, especially 
as party polarization has increased of late.  
 Finally, studies have shown that very few Americans identify as radical or 
reactionary ideologues and that more of them identify as moderates (Fiorina 2004; Treier 
and Hillygus 2009). That has probably been true for some time. As party polarization has 
increased, moderates have increasingly shed their partisan ties and become independents; 
a trend that gives some weight to the rather classic argument asserted by both Downs 
(1957) and Converse (1964) that moderates are pivotal swing voters, decide election 
outcomes, and therefore must be pandered to. 
  
                                                	   2	  Those	  seven	  basic	  ideology	  types	  include	  conservative,	  social	  conservative	  and	  economic	  moderate,	  social	  moderate	  and	  economic	  conservative,	  moderate,	  social	  moderate	  and	  economic	  liberal,	  social	  liberal	  and	  economic	  moderate,	  and	  liberal.	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Liberty. Empirical academic studies on perceptions of liberty and how they influence 
policy stances and public opinion are sparse, if not non-existent. Normative discussions 
are more prevalent, and are enjoyable to engage, but often fail to contribute the desired 
insight. That is because no absolute definition of liberty may be said to exist. Liberty can 
only be defined in very broad terms. Montesquieu (1977, 200) defines liberty in The 
Spirit of the Laws as “a right of doing whatever the laws permit.” However, that is 
inoperable within the context of this study in particular and probably in regard to 
American institutions in general. Were the definition of liberty thus, lawmakers would 
cease to be its protector and would instead become its chief adversary. Thomas Jefferson 
saw this point all too clearly. He wrote in a letter to Isaac H. Tiffany, “rightful liberty is 
unobstructed action according to our will within the limits drawn around us by the equal 
rights of others. I do not add ‘within the limits of the law,’ because law is often but the 
tyrant’s will, and always so when it violates the right of an individual” (Jefferson 1819). 
Applying this interpretation, personal liberty may therefore be broadly defined as the 
right to do whatever one wants up until the point at which the right of others to do 
whatever they want is infringed. 
 Reconciling that definition of liberty with individual policy stances on 
contemporary public health issues can be somewhat problematic. It is not merely a 
personal decision of whether or not to lead a healthy lifestyle. Competing perceptions of 
liberty can emerge and they are often neither obvious nor easily counterbalanced when 
they do. Sometimes the balance actually shifts in favor of regulation. Other times it does 
not. Nevertheless, liberty should not be abandoned every time it is inconsistent with the 
public health, especially when so many Americans have given their lives to secure and 
 Lee 13 
preserve it over the last two centuries. The result would be healthy people living in an 
unhealthy society. Neither should liberty be solely relied upon to determine the viability 
of public health policies. The result would be an unhealthy people living in an unhealthy 
society, for liberty without restraint may be worse than no liberty at all. Achieving the 
maximum health possible of both society and its people would be ideal, and that requires 
finding harmony between liberty and the public health. 
 That broad definition is a popular theme among scholars regardless (Fried 2005), 
and while it is rather useful, it is by no means universal. The definition of liberty has not 
only changed over time to enfranchise more people, there has never really been a 
prevailing consensus of what liberty actually means at any given time in American 
history (Kammen 1986). As a result, liberty is subjective, and competing perceptions of it 
can be invoked to support and oppose the same issue, making it difficult gather 
substantive data. Nevertheless, it is the aim of this study to at least try, for the conflict 
between serious health threats and personal liberty has been and will continue to be 
central to the American public health debate (Gostin et al. 2002; Bayer and Colgrove 
2002).  
 
Risk Perception. Some risk is involved in nearly every undertaking, whether it is 
economic, social, or personal. Public health officials use risk to determine the potential 
harm posed to the population at large by any human activity so they can advocate a 
course of action that mitigates those risks as much as possible. For the purposes of this 
study, risk perception is intended to mean how the public perceives the risks associated 
with unhealthy behaviors and how those perceptions not only influence their personal 
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behavior, but also how those perceptions might inform public policy stances. 
 Experts define risk in terms of annual deaths, whereas the general public tends to 
also incorporate a slew of other elements (Schmidt 2004), and although Americans do 
often estimate annual death rates somewhat accurately (Lichtenstein et al. 1978; Slovic, 
Fischoff, and Lichtenstein 1985), their perception of whether or not they are at risk for 
something is often inflated (Taylor 1999b). Nevertheless, several factors shape how those 
risks are perceived, including, as Markus Schmidt (2004) so keenly articulated, 
voluntariness, controllability, the delay effect, natural vs. manmade, familiarity and 
habituation, as well as benefit and risk-benefit distribution, and the role of the media. 
 Voluntariness refers to whether a risk is assumed voluntarily or is imposed, with 
the former lessening risk perception and the latter heightening it (Renn 1992; Jungermann 
& Slovic 1993). Controllability refers to whether or not a person can control the 
assumption of a risk (Schmidt 2004, 5). If they can, perception of risk is lessened. If they 
cannot, that perception is heightened. The delay effect refers to “the initial event and the 
actual impact of damage” (6). For example, a regular smoker might perceive the risks 
associated with smoking as less because they have yet to develop lung cancer. Schmidt 
also points out that natural risks are more readily assumed than manmade risks, thereby 
lessening the perceived risks of the former and increasing those of the latter (6). 
Familiarity and habituation is a conditioned acceptance of risk that lessens perceptions of 
that risk as it is continually assumed over time (Slovic, Fischoff, and Lichtenstein 1986). 
Benefit and risk-benefit distribution influences perceptions of risk based on who is 
assuming the risk and who benefits as a result. When they are one in the same, the 
perceived risks are lessened. When they are different, those assuming the risk perceive it 
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to be higher. Benefits and risks are also weighed on an individual level (Schmidt 2004, 
8). Finally, concerning the role of the media, risk perceptions can be either heightened or 
lessened depending upon coverage or the lack thereof (9). 
 The resulting perceptions of risk have been shown to influence both personal 
behavior and action (Mileti 1993). As such, personal behavior usually only changes when 
perception of risk is high (Janis and Mann 1977). These findings suggest that risk 
perception not only has a direct impact on personal behavior, but can also inform policy 
stances. Nevertheless, that does not hold true for everyone, and those that perceive risk 
yet seem content to let it endure, either by persisting in risky personal behaviors or by 
opposing regulations intended to mitigate the risks to individuals and communities, must 
be acknowledged.  
  
Public Opinion on the Public Health 
Researchers have had some trouble consistently measuring public opinion of public 
health issues. That is not only because it is difficult to sustain interest in the public health 
(Institute of Medicine, 1), but also because very few know what the public health is 
exactly (Taylor 1997, 2). Overwhelming majorities do view the functions of public health 
as very important once told what they are, but only 57% think that the public health is the 
government’s responsibility (1-2). Typically, the more educated they are, the more 
Americans support increased spending on the public health (Taylor 1999b), yet a CDC 
(1998, 70) study found that support for education and awareness programs is barely 
above 50%. Most Americans, although opposing general sales tax increases, 
overwhelmingly support sales tax increases on tobacco and alcohol products (CDC 1998, 
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69-71), and on alcohol specifically if the taxes are designed to pay for alcohol treatment 
and prevention programs (Denk et al. 2000, 313). 
 Just before the turn of the century, 75% of Americans saw smoking as a major 
health problem, 70% saw alcohol abuse as such, and 63% saw obesity as a major problem 
(Taylor 1999a, 4). A more recent poll found that order flipped, with 81% seeing obesity 
as a very serious problem, 67% seeing smoking as such, and only 47% seeing alcohol as 
very serious (Mendes 2012). Public opinion data on seatbelts is much more difficult to 
come by given that many of those laws are over thirty years old. What is available is data 
on compliance, and, as will be elaborated upon in chapter three, seatbelt use in the United 
States has increased from 11% in 1981 to 85% in 2010 (CDC 1999, 371; NHTSA 
2010b). 
 
Summary 
Public policies are much easier to enact when they are driven by public opinion. 
Unfortunately, public opinion often lags behind the incessant demands of the complex 
American system and it becomes necessary to develop more than just viable public health 
policies. Different policy outcomes must be studied, comprehensive public awareness and 
education programs have to be undertaken, and opposing special interest groups must be 
thwarted, all to build support. To accomplish these ends, it is important to understand 
how factors like party identification, political ideology, as well as perceptions of liberty 
and risk, shape public opinion.  
 Party identification can influence the policy stances of individuals when their 
connection to the party is strong, whether in times of single party dominance or extreme 
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party polarization. However, Americans’ decision-making processes are fluid and able to 
adapt to different circumstances, meaning that Americans are capable of making 
decisions for themselves when they become disillusioned with party politics. That is 
inevitably the case during extreme polarization, when moderates no longer identify with 
the increasingly radical or reactionary platforms of their former party and turn 
independent, thereby strengthening party influence over the rank and file while 
weakening the parties in terms of overall numbers. As such, political ideology is probably 
a much better measure of public opinion, especially when dimensions such as issue type 
are added to the mix. Even then, policy stances may be subject to a variety of factors 
informing individual perceptions of risk and liberty. 
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Chapter 3: The Issues 
 
 While by no means exhaustive, the ensuing discussion incorporates the key 
talking points of each public health issue included in this study, as well as overviews the 
advantages and disadvantages of major policy measures associated therewith. Again, 
those issues include smoking, obesity, alcohol abuse, and seatbelt laws. As will be made 
apparent in chapter four on survey methodology, two public health issues that were 
originally included in this study have been specifically excluded because they are 
inconsistent with the others. Those are hand washing laws and alternative medicine. 
Despite obvious variations, the other four issues are much more salient and are 
measurable in the same way. Hand washing is highly encouraged, but hand washing laws 
are not enforced on the general public. Those laws target employees of businesses, 
especially in the food industry. Defining alternative medicine is a difficult task. There is 
no method by which to determine substances that qualify as alternative medicines, and as 
such, what is considered to be a bona fide alternative medicine to some may be illegal 
and considered harmful by others. 
 
Smoking 
It is rather easy to understand the American fascination with tobacco. After all, had it not 
been developed as a staple crop of the southern colonies during the seventeenth century, 
the British enterprise across the Atlantic might have very well floundered (Burns 2007, 
59-62). Tobacco was developed, however, and it provided the colonies with an economic 
foundation from which to expand and eventually grow into the nation they have become 
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today (59-62). Over the next three centuries, particularly after the Gilded Age brought the 
innovation of the cigarette and greater production capacities to American manufacturers, 
smoking tobacco became increasingly popular (133-35). It was not until the mid-
twentieth century when scientific findings began to expose the detrimental health effects 
of tobacco that its widespread use began to decline.  
 The Surgeon General reported in 2014 that smoking tobacco can cause cancer in 
nearly every organ of the human body, lead to cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, 
have adverse effects on reproductive health, and much more (USDHHS 2014b, 68). 
Secondhand smoke exposure, or what is often called passive smoking, is even more 
sinister in that people risk many of the same detrimental health effects regardless of never 
having actively smoked. Prolonged subjection to a smoky environment is all that is 
required. Leading to the death of nearly 480,000 Americans per year, smoking has 
definitely earned its title as “the leading preventable cause of death in the United States” 
(CDC 2014a). 
 As these detrimental health effects were discovered, local and state governments 
slowly began to intervene. The first state to impose a smoking ban in more than just 
governmental buildings was Minnesota after the legislature passed the Clean Indoor Act 
of 1975. With few exceptions, including bars and restaurants that provided a no smoking 
section, the law prohibited smoking in all “public places, places of employment, public 
transportation, and public meetings.”3 A decade later, the Aspen, Colorado City Council 
passed the first law prohibiting smoking in restaurants unless certain ventilation 
                                                
 3 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 144.411. 
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requirements were met.4 California became the first state to prohibit smoking in all 
enclosed workplaces, including restaurants, in 1995. Bars were exempted from the law 
until 1998.5 In what is now considered the most restrictive smoking ban in the country, 
the City of Calabasas, California passed the Comprehensive Second-hand Smoke Control 
Ordinance of 2006, which effectively prohibits smoking in all public places, indoor or 
outdoor.6 To date, the only federal prohibitions on public smoking include a Department 
of Transportation ban on smoking aboard commercial passenger flights and an executive 
order issued by President Bill Clinton that bans smoking in all indoor public spaces 
occupied by the executive branch.7 8 
 Despite smoking bans such as these, 19% of American adults continued to smoke 
as of 2011. That number has decreased from 42.4% in 1965, but inconsistently. Over a 
10-year span from 1965 to 1974, the amount of American adults that smoked decreased 
by 5.3 percentage points to 34.1%. Over a similar span from 1978 to 1987, that number 
again decreased 5.3 percentage points from 34.1% to 28.8%. In sum, from 1965 to 1987, 
a 23-year span, the amount of American adults that smoked decreased by 13.6 percentage 
points. However, over a 22-year span from 1990 to 2011, that number decreased by only 
6.5 percentage points from 25.5% (CDC 2013). 
                                                
 4 City of Aspen Clean Indoor Air Act of 1985, Aspen, Colorado Municipal Code 
§ 13.16. 
 
 5 California Smoke-Free Workplace Act, Cal. Lab. Code § 6404.5. 
 
 6 Calabasas, California Municipal Code § 8.12. 
 
 7 “Smoking Aboard Aircraft,” Code of Federal Regulation Title 14, Pt. 252, 2000 
ed. 
 
 8 “Protecting Federal Employees and the Public From Exposure to Tobacco 
Smoke in the Federal Workplace,” Federal Register 62 (August 7, 1997) p. 43451. 
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 These diminishing returns may make the goal set by the Office of Disease 
Prevention and Health Promotion of reducing the amount of American adults that smoke 
to 12% by 2020 difficult to achieve (USDHHS 2015). Perhaps that difficulty is due to the 
remaining state and local governments that have yet to enact any comprehensive public 
smoking ban. The jurisdictions that allow public smoking to persist do contain 19.2% of 
the United States population (Americans for Nonsmokers Rights Foundation 2015). 
Perhaps more resources are required than are presently available to reduce smoking 
below a certain level. Most likely, it is due to the fact that nearly every smoking ban is 
first and foremost justified to reduce passive smoking, not necessarily active smoking, 
which ultimately lies at the heart of the matter. 
 Anti-smoking advocates have repeatedly and emphatically suggested that 
Americans ought to quit smoking for good, but total prohibition has yet to become a 
strategy. Even the most restrictive smoking ban in America concedes the right of 
competent adults to smoke. But nonsmokers also have the right to occupy indoor and 
arguably many outdoor public places without being exposed to secondhand smoke. This 
is a prime example of competing perceptions of liberty. 
 Arguing against the proposed Fayetteville amendment that would ban smoking in 
bars, nonsmoker Mary Chodrick wrote the following in a May 4, 2011 e-mail to Mayor 
Lioneld Jordan: 
 Since a person has to be 21 years old to enter or work in these bars, I feel that a 
 patron or employee of these bars is a free participant in the smoking atmosphere. I 
 feel that a non-smoker is free to chose [sic] a bar where smoking is already not 
 allowed . . . I really feel that a basic freedom would be taken away from a person 
 who wishes to have a beer, smoke, and enjoy the camaraderie . . . before a bunch 
 of “do-gooders” arbitrarily took that freedom from him. (Fayetteville 2011, 28) 
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 Chodrick makes a couple of valid points. First, competent adults knowingly 
patronize and seek employment at establishments that allow indoor public smoking. 
Second, patrons that do not want to be exposed to secondhand smoke can simply choose 
to patronize establishments where indoor public smoking is not allowed. As far as the 
employees go, they too can simply choose to seek employment elsewhere if they feel it 
necessary.  
 Chodrick does forget to mention the freedom of business owners to choose how to 
operate. More than 350 opponents signing two different petitions did not. The language 
of one petition read that, “the choice to be a smoking establishment should be left to the 
owner of the establishment” (Fayetteville 2011, 50). This suggests that the right of 
owners to choose is more important than the right of patrons and employees to choose, 
but does not go so far as to rescind the latter. On the contrary, the freedom of all three is 
seemingly preserved. Employees of smoking establishments in Fayetteville even signed 
and submitted typed statements to the City Council affirming as much. They read, “I 
choose to work in a smoking establishment where I am knowingly exposed to second 
hand smoke and any potential health risks it might pose. I choose to work in this 
environment because I am an adult and capable of making my own decisions” (60-125). 
Why then would government infringe upon such obvious exercises of personal liberty 
when it seems as though the free market has already worked everything out? 
 Advocates of the proposed amendment argue that the market has not worked 
everything out. On April 27, 2011, Dr. Robert Patton sent an e-mail to the amendment’s 
sponsor, Alderwoman Adella Gray, noting that, “in a time of high unemployment, you 
[Gray] are protecting the worker faced with a decision between their job and their 
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health.” Patton writes further, “[t]here is no excuse for exempting public venues such as 
bars . . . Research shows that anti-smoking legislation results in a reduction of overall 
tobacco use in the community” (Fayetteville 2011, 26). These are also valid points. 
During the first half of 2011, the unemployment rate was on the rise in Arkansas. In 
January, it was at 7.8%, and by June, it was up to 8.1% (Arkansas Department of 
Workforce Services 2011, 5). The potential then for a person seeking employment to 
settle for a job that may compromise their health is very real. Moreover, a ban on 
smoking in bars could in fact reduce overall tobacco use in the community. Trotter, 
Wakefield, and Borland (2002, 300) examined the behavior of socially cued smokers and 
found that 69% of adult smokers patronize bars, that 70% of them have a propensity to 
smoke more when in that setting, and that 25% of them would probably quit were a ban 
imposed. The study was conducted in Victoria, Australia, but the cultural divide 
notwithstanding, those percentages suggest that a significant decrease in the adult 
smoking population would result from a ban on smoking in bars—an agreeable by-
product of a measure that seeks to reduce passive smoking. 
 Dr. Patton also made what is probably the most viable argument used by 
advocates of smoking bans when he stated that, “smokers are less healthy and utilize 
more healthcare resources than the nonsmoker. We, as citizens, pay a part of that bill 
through higher healthcare costs” (Fayetteville 2011, 26). The overall economic impact of 
smokers does put pressure on healthcare providers, raising costs that are ultimately 
passed on to smokers and nonsmokers alike in the form of higher insurance premiums 
and deductibles. When smokers who have subsidized healthcare plans such as Medicaid 
get sick, states are often forced to pick up the bill. The Office of Disease Prevention and 
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Health Promotion reports that “tobacco use costs the U.S. $193 billion annually in direct 
medical expenses and lost productivity” (USDHHS, 2015). 
 Several assertions made by both opponents and advocates of the proposed 
amendment do not withstand scrutiny. Opponents argue that smoking bans have a 
negative economic impact on businesses by driving off well-established clientele and 
making it harder to compete. However, Scollo et al. (2003, 13) refute those claims, 
inquiring into the legitimacy of economic studies and concluding that, “[p]olicymakers 
can act to protect workers and patrons from the toxins in secondhand smoke confident in 
rejecting industry claims that there will be an adverse economic impact.” Opponents also 
neglect to take the liberty claims of nonsmokers into account. Many bars serve as venues 
where public events, including the performing arts, take place. As a result, nonsmokers 
cannot simply choose to patronize a different establishment. They are faced with the 
choice of either subjecting themselves to an unhealthy environment or being excluded. 
Some nonsmokers are further burdened by physical ailments such as asthma that preclude 
them altogether from patronizing establishments that allow indoor public smoking, 
depriving them of any choice whatsoever and basically subjecting them to inadvertent 
discrimination. Finally, opponents neglect the bargaining power of owners, who are at a 
tremendous advantage when negotiating the terms of employment with prospective 
employees. 
 Advocates fail to address the fact that the amount of establishments in Fayetteville 
that are exempt from the statewide smoking ban and choose to allow indoor public 
smoking are few in proportion to the amount of establishments that are either not exempt 
or choose not to allow indoor public smoking. There are consequently many more jobs 
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available to nonsmokers seeking employment in the hospitality industry than there are for 
smokers or those willing to be exposed to secondhand smoke, even with a high 
unemployment rate. Furthermore, any argument for the minority rights of disabled 
persons must mention the minority rights of others, including smokers. People with 
physical ailments exacerbated by secondhand smoke may still turn to nonsmoking 
establishments, whereas smokers would have no alternative were smoking banned in 
bars. Finally, with respect to the negative economic impact of smoking, smokers offset 
those costs at least in part by paying insurance plan surcharges and tobacco sales taxes. 
 Tobacco sales taxes are a part of a broader strategy by public officials to reduce 
both active and passive smoking, but unlike other policy measures that actually spend 
taxpayer money, taxes achieve the feat of both reducing tobacco use and generating 
revenue. That revenue can be used to offset the negative economic impact of smoking, be 
earmarked as special revenues to address specific areas of concern, be used to supplement 
the general fund, and more. Tobacco sales taxes have been employed at the federal and 
state level, as well as very few municipalities, and were implemented or increased 
significantly throughout the country after the Surgeon General reported in 2000 that, 
“[i]ncreases in the price of cigarettes will lead to reductions in both smoking prevalence 
and cigarette consumption among smokers” (USDHHS, 19). In 2009, the federal 
government began to impose a sales tax of $1.01 per pack of 20 cigarettes, approximately 
a 159% increase of the former rate enacted in 1997.9 While inconsistent, every state also 
imposes a sales tax on cigarettes. The highest state sales tax per pack of cigarettes in the 
                                                
 9 The Children Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, U.S. Code 
26 (2009) § 5701(b). 
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country is New York at $4.35.10 The lowest state sales tax per pack of cigarettes in the 
country is Missouri at $0.17.11 Since October 1, 2013, Arkansas has imposed a sales tax 
of $1.15 per pack of cigarettes.12 Although not raised off of cigarettes alone, Arkansas 
reported gross tobacco sales tax revenues of nearly $49 million for fiscal year 2014 (State 
of Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration 2014).  
 The negative economic impact of smoking is also offset through the Tobacco 
Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) of 1998, in which the four largest tobacco 
companies in the United States at the time—Philip Morris, R. J. Reynolds, Brown & 
Williamson, and Lorillard—agreed to pay 46 states $206 billion through 2025 (Cutler et 
al. 2002).13 Not only does this continue to help states financially, Sloan and Trogdon 
(2004) found that the MSA substantially decreased smoking rates because tobacco 
companies passed that cost on to consumers in the form of more expensive products. 
Since passing the Tobacco Settlement Proceeds Act of 2000 by referendum, Arkansas 
remains one of the only states to actually spend their settlement money on health related 
programs.14 Those programs include the Arkansas Aging Initiative, the Arkansas 
Bioscience Institute, the College of Public Health, the Delta Area Health Education 
                                                
 10 N.Y. Tax Law § 20-471 (2010). 
 
 11 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 149.0015 (2014). 
 
 12 Ark. Code Ann. § 26-57-208, 26-57-802, 26-57-803, 26-57-804, 26-57-806, 26-
57-1101 (2014). 
 	   13	  The	  remaining	  four	  states—Florida,	  Minnesota,	  Mississippi,	  and	  Texas	  had	  previously	  reached	  individual	  agreements.	  Also,	  Brown	  &	  Williamson	  merged	  with	  R.	  J.	  Reynolds	  in	  2004	  to	  form	  Reynolds	  American.	  	  	   14	  Ark.	  Code	  Ann.	  §	  19-­‐12-­‐101.	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Center, Medicaid Expansion Programs, the Minority Health Initiative, and the Tobacco 
Prevention and Cessation Program (Shultz et al. 2012). 
 Effective policy measures that cost money include a slew of government funded 
media campaigns that have sprung up all across the nation. On the federal level, the 
“Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) launched the first-ever paid national 
tobacco education campaign—Tips From Former Smokers (Tips) in March 2012” (CDC 
2014b). The Tips campaign depicts former smokers coping with various illnesses suffered 
as a direct result of smoking. Intentionally graphic, the goal of the campaign is not only 
to encourage current smokers to quit, but also to provide them with the necessary 
resources and information to be successful. According to McAfee et al. (2013, 2007-8), 
the Tips campaign encouraged approximately 1.6 million smokers to attempt cessation in 
2012 alone, with approximately 100,000 being successful. The campaign was continued 
in 2013 and 2014. 
 On the state level, the implementation of similar tobacco education campaigns has 
varied considerably. “[A] few (such as California and New York) have run consistent 
media campaigns for many years, whereas others have either never run media campaigns 
or have made intermittent efforts at low doses” (McAfee et al. 2013, 2003). In Arkansas, 
the Department of Health (ADH) launched its Stamp Out Smoking (SOS) campaign, 
which has released at least 42 different television, radio, and print ads since 2009 (Stamp 
Out Smoking 2014).15 SOS also utilizes the national 1-800-QUIT-NOW hotline. It 
redirects callers to their state’s respective call center. Remarkably, “[a]ll states have 
quitlines with trained coaches who provide information and help with quitting” 
                                                
 15 The campaign itself began in 2002. 
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(Smokefree.gov 2014). ADH also provides grants to community programs designed to 
curb tobacco use. The architect of the proposed 2011 Fayetteville amendment, the 
Northwest Arkansas Tobacco-Free Coalition, is in fact a recipient of such a grant. Both 
the ADH grant program and media campaign are a direct product of funds received from 
the Tobacco MSA. 
 Packaging and advertising is heavily regulated as well, this time mostly by the 
federal government and sparingly by state and local governments. These regulations 
ensure consumers are informed of the detrimental health effects of smoking and that 
advertisements do not run rampant. The first effective packaging regulation was the 
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965. It forced manufacturers to place 
a warning on the outside of every pack of cigarettes that read “Caution: Cigarette 
Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health.”16 Current law now allows manufacturers 
to choose between one of nine more specific warning labels. Over time, minimums on 
font size, type, and color were also implemented to make the warning labels more 
conspicuous.17 Advertising regulations began in earnest with the Public Health Cigarette 
Smoking Act of 1970. It banned tobacco advertisements on broadcast television and 
radio.18 Opponents railed against the provision, citing First Amendment protections, but 
the provision survived legal challenges on the grounds that it promoted a compelling 
government interest—the public health. The Surgeon General has now backed up that 
interest with evidence, reporting that, “[i]ntensive review of the available data . . . 
                                                
 16 Public Law 89-92, U.S. Statutes at Large 79 (1965): 283. 
 
 17 Cigarette Labeling and Advertising, U.S. Code 15 (2014) § 1333. 
 
 18 Public Law 91-222, U.S. Statutes at Large 84 (1970): 89. 
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suggests a positive correlation between level of advertising and overall tobacco 
consumption” (USDHHS 2000). Advertising regulations have multiplied as a result. 
   
Obesity 
Obesity is the second leading cause of preventable death in the United States (Mokdad et 
al. 2004, 1238). Predominantly the result of poor diet and lack of exercise, the 
detrimental health effects of obesity, according to the National Heart, Lung, and Blood 
Institute, include heart disease, hypertension, type 2 diabetes, respiratory problems, 
cancer, and more (National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute 2014). Unlike smoking rates, 
however, obesity rates have remained steady for some time. Ogden et al. (2014, 806) 
found that as late as “2011-2012 . . . 34.9% . . . of adults aged 20 years or older were 
obese,” and that those rates had not significantly changed during the preceding eight 
years. Concerning economic impact, Finklestein et al. (2009, 822) found that obesity 
could have increased medical costs as much as $147 billion by 2008. These facts are 
alarming, and it is no wonder that public officials have finally started to intervene. 
 Instead of addressing all the factors associated with obesity, this study will rather 
focus on the particular personal behavior of consuming large sugary beverages. The 
National Center for Health Statistics indicates that consumption of sugary beverages is 
linked to obesity and that, “[a]pproximately one-half of the U.S. population consumes 
sugar drinks on any given day” (Ogden et al. 2011). Even if that is limited to one sugary 
beverage per day, it is still well above the American Heart Association’s recommendation 
of consuming fewer than three sugary drinks per week (Lloyd-Jones et al. 2010, 596). 
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There is no doubt then that Americans need to reduce their sugary beverage intake, but 
can government facilitate that result without a resounding outcry? 
 The most contentious attempt at reducing the consumption of sugary beverages 
came in the form of a 2012 initiative adopted by the New York City Board of Health that 
sought to prohibit hospitality oriented establishments from selling sugary beverages 
greater than 16 ounces (New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 
Board of Health 2014). Ultimately, the regulation never went into effect after the New 
York Court of Appeals struck it down on the grounds that it violated separation of 
powers.19 A similar measure instituted by a legislative body such as the New York City 
Council or the New York State Legislature probably would have withstood the challenge. 
Another failed attempt at reducing the consumption of sugary beverages was California’s 
proposed Sugar-Sweetened Beverages Safety Warning Act of 2014. Rather than a limit 
on sugary beverage sizes, this bill sought to regulate product packaging by requiring a 
warning label that read, “STATE OF CALIFORNIA SAFETY WARNING: Drinking 
beverages with added sugars contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay.”20 The bill 
passed the California State Senate, but failed in the Assembly. Probably the most feasible 
policy measure pursued so far has been taxation. According to the Council of State 
Governments, “39 states and Washington, D.C., impose a sales tax on at least some soda 
purchases,” with only “[t]hree states – Washington, Arkansas, and West Virginia – 
impos[ing] an excise tax on soft drinks at the wholesale level” (The Council of State 
                                                
 19 New York Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. The New 
York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 23 NY3d 681 (2014). 
 
 20 Sugar-Sweetened Beverages Safety Warning Act of 2014, Cal. S.B. 1000 
(2014). 
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Governments 2014). Nevertheless, no additional sales tax directly targeted soft drinks at 
the consumer level until very recently. On November 4, 2014, residents of Berkeley, 
California voted overwhelmingly in favor of the first “sin” tax on soda, levying one-cent 
per ounce of soda purchased.21 The federal government has made no significant attempt 
at reducing the consumption of sugary beverages other than requiring that products 
include a list of ingredients on their packaging. 
 The concerns involved with attempting to regulate the consumption of sugary 
beverages hinge upon the regulations themselves. A compelling government interest has 
been established, but should efforts manifest themselves in the form of size limitations as 
attempted by the New York City Board of Health? Those that consume large sugary 
beverages do not pose an immediate threat to themselves and to others like those that 
consume excessive amounts of alcohol do. Size limitations also do not prevent consumers 
from simply imbibing multiple servings, which would be the case even if size limitations 
were extended to include convenience and grocery stores. These limitations therefore 
seem unworkable. The California bill to put a warning label on sugary drink packaging 
on the other hand does preserve liberty in the sense that it merely attempts to educate 
rather than limit. New York Times published an article by Reed Abelson (2011) that 
discussed what might prove to be a viable option—Body Mass Index (BMI) requirements 
imposed by insurance companies, under which people become eligible for premium 
discounts if those requirements are met or a doctor declares the requirements to be 
unreasonable for that particular person. Finally, taxation preserves liberty as well, and 
could very well offset some of the negative economic impact resulting from obesity. 
                                                
 21 Imposing a General Tax on the Distribution of Sugar-Sweetened Beverage 
Products. Berkeley, CA, Municipal Code § 7.72 (2014). 
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Alcohol Abuse 
Alcohol abuse has been every bit as controversial an issue as smoking, if not more so. 
However, it was treated much more as a social issue at first than as a health issue. Eric 
Burns wrote in his book The Spirits of America: 
 [A]n individual who had drifted too many sheets to the wind wreaked . . . havoc 
 on his community, breaking the social contract in almost all of its provisions. He 
 ruined property, alienated friends and inflicted wounds, both physical and 
 emotional, on members of his own family, wounds that were in many cases so 
 severe they could never be healed. Then as now, the latter was the most insidious 
 effect of inebriation: beaten wives, terrified children, family environments so 
 toxic that out of them could come nothing but more malefactions, more violations 
 of the social contract. (Burns 2004, 71-2) 
 
Hoping to reduce these consequences, the temperance movement began in the early 
nineteenth century. The movement culminated in 1919 with the ratification of the 
Eighteenth Amendment, which effectively prohibited alcohol in the United States. Such a 
drastic remedy ultimately proved inoperable though, leading to repeal of the amendment 
in 1933 with the ratification of the Twenty-first. In a rare move of the New Deal Era 
towards federalism, the new amendment relinquished authority over alcohol to the states. 
Section two of the Twenty-first Amendment reads, “[t]he transportation or importation 
into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of 
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”22 Many states 
subsequently legalized alcohol statewide or relinquished authority yet again to local 
jurisdictions. Other states kept prohibition intact. In 1966, more than three decades later, 
Mississippi was the last state to repeal its prohibition laws (LiquorLaws.net 2009). 
 Prohibition may not have been feasible, but temperance advocates still worked to 
limit access to alcohol. After all, the social issues related with alcohol abuse did not just 
                                                
 22 U.S. Constitution, amend. 21, sec. 2. 
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go away. On top of that, knowledge about the health issues related to alcohol abuse was 
becoming more widespread, and limiting access to alcohol could curb those effects too. 
The CDC currently reports both short-term and long-term health risks associated with 
drinking. In the short-term, alcohol abuse can lead to personal injury, violence, alcohol 
poisoning, risky sexual behavior, and reproductive problems. In the long-term, alcohol 
abuse can lead to heart disease, cirrhosis of the liver, cancer, brain damage, mental health 
issues, and alcoholism (CDC 2014c).  
 To combat this, measures have been enacted at all levels of government. For 
example, municipalities heavily regulate businesses by requiring that bars and retail 
liquor stores obtain certain permits and adhere to certain hours of operation. Counties in 
many states have the power to decide for themselves whether or not to allow alcohol 
sales at all. States enforce drunk-driving laws as well as set standards for product alcohol 
content. Technically, states also control the legal drinking age, but the federal 
government for all intents and purposes usurped that power when Congress passed the 
National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984. That law forced states to set a minimum 
drinking age of 21 years or suffer cutbacks in federal highway funding.23 Every state 
eventually complied. Finally, like the tobacco industry, the federal government also 
regulates the advertising practices of the alcohol industry. 
 Despite these efforts, Americans continue to abuse alcohol. “In 2012, 24.6 percent 
of people ages 18 or older reported that they engaged in binge drinking in the past month; 
7.1 percent reported that they engaged in heavy drinking in the past month.” As a result, 
17 million adults have alcohol related disorders, which lead to the death of approximately 
                                                
 23 23 U.S. Code 23 (2014) § 158. 
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88,000 Americans every year and make alcohol abuse “the third leading preventable 
cause of death in the United States” (National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism 
2014).  
 There are several liberty concerns involved with alcohol. Foremost, that 
government would seek to deprive competent adults of the choice to drink is rather 
alarming. To be sure, government probably ought to regulate personal behavior to some 
extent, but prohibit it altogether? Should other unhealthy behaviors be prohibited too? 
Temperance advocates might point out that the Eighteenth Amendment did not prohibit 
people from drinking alcohol, but from manufacturing, transporting, and selling it. 
Nevertheless, outright prohibition was the de facto law. And what about those post-
Prohibition state provisions that allowed the sale of alcohol to be outlawed in one county 
but permitted it in the next? The lengths to which people were willing to circumvent the 
law during Prohibition suggest that distance would not be a deterrent, but simply an 
obstacle that could lead to an increase in drunk-driving—the area where temperance 
advocates stand on the most solid ground, for taking the liberty of driving drunk deprives 
others of the liberty to travel American highways safely. 
 Another liberty concern is the national minimum drinking age of 21. Opponents 
stress the fact that 18 is the age of majority in nearly every other legal aspect. At the age 
of 18, Americans are considered legal adults, they can vote, and they can enlist in the 
armed forces. In other words, 18 to 20 year olds can be convicted by their country, help 
shape it, and die for it, they just cannot publicly drink alcoholic beverages within its 
confines. This might seem tantamount to age discrimination, but the only two 21 to drink 
laws ever to be challenged on those grounds were upheld by a United States District 
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Court in Michigan and the Louisiana State Supreme Court, respectively. They both held 
that age is not a suspect classification protected by the Constitution and therefore that the 
state was promoting a compelling government interest that trumped any potential 
discrimination involved.24 25 
 As with smoking and obesity, the most viable argument made by temperance 
advocates is that alcohol abusers have an overall negative economic impact. They too put 
pressure on healthcare providers and raise costs that are ultimately passed on to others. 
Alcohol abusers also cause a significant amount of property damage, especially through 
drunk-driving related automobile accidents. That alone caused alcohol to exceed the 
previously stated economic impact of smoking by some $30 billion. In 2006, “[t]he 
estimated cost of excessive drinking was $223.5 billion” (Bouchery et al. 2011, 516). 
 
Seatbelt Usage 
According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2010a; hereafter 
NHTSA), over 33,000 people were killed as a result of traffic accidents in 2009, a trend 
that ranks it the sixth leading cause of preventable death in the United States. Of those 
killed, 53% were not wearing seatbelts. While that number remains high, it has decreased 
significantly since state governments started requiring some sort of seatbelt use beginning 
in 1984. All vehicle occupants are now required to wear a seatbelt in 28 states and 
Washington, D.C. Front seat occupants are required to wear a seatbelt in 21 states 
(Insurance Institute for Highway Safety 2014). Enforcement does vary, but only to the 
                                                
 24 R. Guy, Opinion, Ref. Civil No. 8-73015 and Civil No. 8-73159, U.S. District 
Court, Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, Detroit, MI, December 22, 1978. 
 
 25 Manuel v. State Of Louisiana, 692 So. 2d 320 (La. 1996). 
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extent that some states have passed primary seatbelt laws that allow police officers to 
issue citations if a violation is observed, whereas other states have passed secondary 
seatbelt laws that only allow police officers to issue citations if another traffic violation is 
observed first. Regardless, seatbelt laws have resulted in an increase of seatbelt use from 
11% in 1981 to 85% in 2010 (CDC 1999, 371; NHTSA 2010b). 
 Compared to the other issues discussed in this study, the liberty concerns with 
seatbelt laws are relatively straightforward. Opponents of seatbelt laws complain that 
competent adults ought to be allowed to assume the risk of not wearing a seatbelt while in 
a moving vehicle because it has no affect on others. That might be a sound argument 
were it not for the negative economic impact resulting from a lack of seatbelt use. Like 
people that smoke, make poor diet choices, and abuse alcohol, people who do not wear 
seatbelts put added stress on healthcare providers and raise costs. That is because people 
who do not wear seatbelts are more likely to suffer serious injury and even death when in 
traffic accidents. NHTSA (2009) reports that, “lap/shoulder seat belts, when used, reduce 
the risk of fatal injury to front seat occupants (age 5 and older) of passenger cars by 45 
percent and the risk of moderate-to-critical injury by 50 percent.” Having established a 
compelling government interest, the only question that remains is whether human lives 
are worth the reductions in personal liberty. 
 
Summary 
Opponents of public measures that are intended to curb the detrimental health effects of 
these issues often espouse personal liberty as the crux of their argument. To them, any 
negative consequences are self-imposed. Taken to the extreme, a person therefore ought 
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to be able to drive to their favorite bar that allows indoor public smoking with no seatbelt 
on and a spiked, gallon-sized soft drink in the center console. Unfortunately, it is not that 
easy. All the externalities resulting from unhealthy personal behaviors must be 
acknowledged and taken into account. When they are, the issues become much more 
complicated. Other determinants such as personal behavior and public consciousness play 
a role too. That is not to say that personal liberty ought to be altogether discarded, but is 
to say that the public health is enough of a compelling government interest to warrant at 
least some regulation. 
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Chapter 4: Hypotheses / Survey Development 
 
Hypotheses 
1. The more an individual engages in an unhealthy personal behavior, the less likely 
that individual is to support regulation of that behavior. 
2. The more an individual believes that engaging in an unhealthy personal behavior 
is a question of personal liberty, the less likely that individual is to support 
regulation of that behavior. 
3. The more conscience an individual is of others engaging in an unhealthy personal 
behavior, the more likely that individual is to support regulation of that behavior. 
4. The more liberal an individual is, the more likely that individual is to support 
public health regulations. 
5. Democrats are more likely to support public health regulations. 
6. The less risky an individual perceives secondhand smoke to be, the less likely that 
individual is to support indoor public smoking regulations. 
 
Developing the Survey 
The web-based survey utilized in this study was developed during June 2014 and 
invitations to participate were distributed from September 8, 2014 to September 16, 2014 
via e-mail to approximately 1576 undergraduate students at the University of Arkansas.26 
Those students had officially declared majors in Political Science, Psychology, and/or 
Criminal Justice, although some had unofficially switched degree programs prior to 
                                                	   26	  For	  the	  complete	  survey,	  see	  the	  Appendix	  .	  	  
 Lee 39 
taking the survey. The data collected from the survey should not be mistaken for a 
statistical sample of a larger population such as the City of Fayetteville, the State of 
Arkansas, or the country at large. The only population that the sample may be said to 
represent is the 1576 students to whom the survey was distributed. Nevertheless, as this 
study is preliminary and is merely an effort intended to spur further scholarly research, it 
still has considerable merit. 
 Encompassing 43 items, the survey is comprised of three major sections: issue 
questionnaire, additional questions on smoking, and demographics. Respondents were 
first asked to answer questions concerning six major health issues in the United States, 
including secondhand smoke exposure, diet, alcohol abuse, seatbelt usage, hand washing, 
and alternative medicine. As discussed in chapter three, diet is narrowed to large sugary 
beverage consumption. Also discussed was that both hand washing and alternative 
medicine had to be excluded to promote consistency because they ultimately proved 
irreconcilable with the other four issues. Each remaining issue was broken into five 
distinct question types that focused on personal behavior, public consciousness, 
regulation support, inclination towards personal liberty, and issue importance. Responses 
were measured along a five-point Likert-scale, ranging from strongly disagree (1), 
somewhat disagree (2), neutral (3), somewhat agree (4), to strongly agree (5). Indices for 
each question type were subsequently generated based on the sum of all responses. 
 The first question type measured respondents’ personal behavior. For example, 
respondents were asked to what extent they agree with the statement “I always wear my 
seatbelt while in a moving vehicle.” The more respondents agreed with the statement, the 
less they engaged in that unhealthy personal behavior. The second question type, public 
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consciousness, measured whether respondents’ expected or encouraged others to behave 
in a healthy way. For example, respondents were asked to what extent they agree with the 
statement “I encourage others to refrain from consuming large sugary beverages.” The 
more respondents agreed with the statement, the more conscious they were of others 
engaging in that unhealthy personal behavior. 
 The third question type, regulation support, measured respondents’ support for 
certain public policies. For example, respondents were asked to what extent they agree 
with the statement “Laws regulating the sale and public consumption of alcohol are 
necessary to prevent drinking and driving, alcoholism, liver disease, and cirrhosis.” The 
more respondents agreed with the statement, the more they supported regulation of that 
unhealthy personal behavior. The fourth question type, views towards personal liberty, 
measured respondents’ opposition to government regulation and belief that engaging in 
an unhealthy personal behavior is a question of personal liberty. For example, 
respondents were asked to what extent they agree with the statement “The government 
should stay out of it. Adults should be able to decide for themselves whether or not to go 
to bars that allow public indoor smoking.” The more respondents agreed with the 
statement, the more they believed that engaging in that unhealthy personal behavior is a 
question of personal liberty. 
 The fifth question type, issue importance, measured respondents’ interest in 
public health issues. For example, respondents were asked to what extent they agree with 
the statement “Laws that prohibit smoking in bars are an important issue to me.” The 
more respondents agreed with the statement, the more important they believed that 
unhealthy personal behavior is an important issue. This will be important to measure 
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whether or not there is a difference in policy stances between those who believe the 
issues are important and those who do not. After all, those who show up are the ones that 
decide public policy.  
 Respondents were next asked five additional questions on smoking in order to 
better identify policy approaches with strong public support and to compare the results 
concerning secondhand smoke by asking the same questions in a slightly different way. 
The first question, however, gauged respondents’ perception of secondhand smoke 
exposure as a risk by asking whether or not they believed evidence suggesting that 
secondhand smoke exposure has detrimental health effects. The remaining four questions 
gauged respondents’ support for an all-out ban on public smoking, support for clean air 
alternatives to an all-out ban, support for current laws, as well as opposition to current 
laws. Responses were measured along the same five-point Likert-scale used during the 
issue questionnaire. 
 Finally, respondents were asked eight demographic questions to further filter and 
analyze the data as necessary. Those questions included sex, date of birth (converted to 
age in years), party identification, political ideology, smoking frequency, smoking 
setting, and bar attendance. Sex is a dichotomous question. Date of birth is a fill-in-the-
blank question. Party identification is a nominal question, allowing for strong or lean 
identification with either major party, as well as identification as a moderate, 
independent, or other. By excluding the respondents who identified as independent or 
other, answers to this question may be measured along the same five-point Likert-scale 
used for the issue questionnaire and additional questions on smoking. Political ideology 
is measured along that same scale. Smoking frequency and bar attendance are measured 
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along very similar six-point and seven-point Likert-scales, respectively. Smoking setting 
is a nominal question that is somewhat contingent upon smoking frequency. 
 
Shortcomings 
There are several methodological shortcomings in this study that need to be addressed. 
The limited scope in population that the sample size represents has already been 
mentioned. Future research of a similar nature should attempt to achieve a statistical 
sample of a larger population within a jurisdiction, such as the City of Fayetteville, the 
State of Arkansas, or the country at large. It may be necessary to refine the survey to 
accomplish that. In its present form, the survey is lengthy, and at least ten questions were 
thrown out due to inconsistency.27 Those questions could have been used to ask a whole 
battery of questions on both liberty and risk and further developed those lines of inquiry, 
allowing for the possibility of competing perceptions of liberty and the measurement of 
each factor shaping risk perception as articulated by Schmidt (2004). Finally, the survey 
should have measured political ideology two-dimensionally as suggested by, e.g., Shafer 
and Claggett (1995) and Treier and Hillygus (2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                	   27	  See	  page	  18.	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Chapter 5: Data 
 
Demographics 
Although several respondents did not answer every question, there were 284 respondents 
who answered either all or nearly all of the questions.28 Out of the 1576 students to whom 
the survey was distributed, that is roughly an 18% response rate. Respondents varied in 
years of age from 18 to 61, with a mean of 21.71. Over three-quarters of the respondents 
are female (216) and only 23.4% are male (66). As far as party identification, 8.1% of the 
respondents identified as a strong Democrat (23), 19.1% Democrat (54), 17.3% moderate 
(49), 15.9% lean Republican (45), 14.1% strong Republican (40), 16.6% independent 
(47), and 8.8% as other (25). As far as political ideology, 16.3% of the respondents 
identified as very liberal (46), 21.9% somewhat liberal (62), 30.4% middle of the road 
(86), 21.9% somewhat conservative (62), and 9.5% very conservative. 
 Over half of the respondents claimed to have never smoked cigarettes (157), 
while almost 10% claimed to have once smoked but to have successfully quit (27). 
Nearly 20% of the respondents claimed to have only smoked one or two cigarettes in the 
past (53), and fewer than 15% claimed to smoke either between five cigarettes a month 
but less than half a pack a day (21) or to sometimes smoke but less than five cigarettes a 
month (21). Only 1.8% of the respondents claimed to smoke more than half a pack of 
cigarettes a day (5). Of those respondents who admitted to smoking (96), 53.1% claimed 
to do so at bars or at parties (51), 30.2% at bars or at parties and sometimes by 
                                                	   28	  Where	  appropriate,	  means	  were	  substituted	  for	  unanswered	  questions.	  These	  means	  are	  not	  a	  part	  of	  the	  demographic	  data	  presented,	  but	  are	  used	  in	  calculating	  correlation	  coefficients.	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themselves (29), and 16.7% claimed to smoke only by themselves (16). 
 Just fewer than 60% of the respondents claimed to go out to bars at least once a 
year (167), while 40.6% never go to bars (114). This number is probably skewed 
considering that the mean age of respondents is barely over 21, making it illegal for many 
respondents to enter bars. Regardless, as 18-20 year olds are eligible voting citizens, their 
voice is just as relevant as those who are legal to drink. Over 25% of the respondents 
claimed to go out to bars at least once a month (80).  
 
Correlation Coefficients 
Relationships between survey responses are measured using Pearson Correlation 
Coefficients (r) and are presented below in tables II through VI. It is important to note 
that, as always, correlation does not imply causation, but merely a linear relationship 
between two variables. For the purposes of this study, the strength of that relationship is 
defined as follows: 
Table I 
Correlation  
Coefficient (r) 
Relationship 
Strength 
r = 1 Perfect 
1 > r > 0.7 Strong 
0.7 > r > 0.3 Moderate 
0.3 > r > 0 Weak 
r = 0 No Relationship 
 
The relationship between two variables can also be measured directionally in terms of 
positive or negative value of r. A positive value indicates that there is a direct relationship 
between two variables, or that, as one gets larger, so does the other. A negative value 
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indicates an inverse relationship between two variables, or that, as one gets larger, the 
other gets smaller. Statistical significance of each correlation is determined using p-value 
thresholds of .025 and .0005. The p-values themselves are derived from sample size (n) 
and r using a one-tailed test. Any relationship with a p-value greater than .025 is 
considered not statistically significant. Those with a p-value less than .0005 are 
considered very significant. 
 Table II shows the relationship between certain beliefs/personal behaviors and 
policy stances measured in the issue questionnaire and demographic survey sections. 
Those relationships may provide support for hypotheses one through five. As indicated in 
chapter four, personal behavior is measured using responses to question type one on the 
issue questionnaire, personal liberty by question type four, and public consciousness by 
question type two. Policy stances are measured in terms of regulation support, which is 
measured using responses to question type three on the issue questionnaire. Political 
ideology and party identification are measured using responses to those questions in the 
demographic section, although respondents who identified as either independent or other 
have been measured separately to achieve linearity. That is why n drops from 284 to 211 
on party identification. The same applies to subsequent tables. Finally, indices were 
created using the sum of the responses for each question type on the issue questionnaire 
to measure the relationship between certain beliefs/personal behaviors and policy stances 
overall. 
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Table II 
Support for Regulation 
Secondhand 
Smoke 
Large Sugary 
Beverages 
Alcohol 
Abuse 
Seatbelt 
Laws Overall 
 
B
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Personal 
Behavior 
.491** 
n=284 
.177* 
n=284 
.415** 
n=284 
.396** 
n=284 
.380** 
n=284 
Personal 
Liberty 
-.637** 
n=284 
-.592** 
n=284 
-.629** 
n=284 
-.634** 
n=284 
-.696** 
n=284 
Public 
Consciousness 
.557** 
n=284 
.272** 
n=284 
.454** 
n=284 
.537** 
n=284 
.520** 
n=284 
Political 
Ideology 
.047 
n=284 
.160* 
n=284 
-.072 
n=284 
.005 
n=284 
-.060 
n=284 
Party 
Identification 
.074 
n=211 
-.180* 
n=211 
-.097 
n=211 
.121 
n=211 
-.030 
n=211 
* p-value < .025;  ** p-value < .0005 
 
The table indicates a statistically significant, moderately direct relationship between 
healthy personal behavior and support for regulation overall (r=.380), as well as in each 
category except large sugary beverages. There, the relationship is also statistically 
significant and direct, but weak in strength (r=.177). The relationship between views on 
personal liberty and support for regulation is statistically significant and moderate in each 
category. However, in each instance, there is an inverse relationship rather than a direct 
relationship. Overall, the relationship between views on personal liberty and support for 
regulation is moderate, but it is on the cusp of having a strong inverse relationship  
(r=-.696). The relationship between public consciousness and support for regulation is 
statistically significant and moderate in every category except, again, large sugary 
beverages. There, the relationship is also statistically significant and direct, but weak in 
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strength (r=.272). Overall, public consciousness and support for regulation have a 
statistically significant, moderately direct relationship (r=.520). The only statistically 
significant relationships between political ideology or party identification and support for 
regulation occur under the large sugary beverage category, and both of those 
relationships are weak in strength (r=.160; r=-.180). 
 Table III shows the same relationships for political ideology as Table II, except 
that Table III includes only those respondents who identified as either independent or 
other. This could establish stronger relationships between political ideology and support 
for regulation for those respondents who did not identify with a party than those 
relationships between political ideology and support for regulation for those respondents 
who did identify with a party. 
Table III 
Support for Regulation 
Secondhand 
Smoke 
Large Sugary 
Beverages 
Alcohol 
Abuse 
Seatbelt 
Laws Overall 
Political 
Ideology 
.061 
n=72 
-.051 
n=72 
-.053 
n=72 
-.138 
n=72 
-.060 
n=72 
     * p-value < .025;  ** p-value < .0005 
 
Changes in the data are only considered substantive if there was a statistically significant 
relationship that was at least moderately strong and that is no longer the case, or if that 
was not the case and it now is. Changes in the strength of statistically significant 
relationships from moderate to strong and vice versa are also observed. There was no 
substantive change in the data from Table II. 
 Table IV also shows the relationship between certain beliefs/personal behaviors 
and policy stances except that it concentrates solely on the issue of secondhand smoke by 
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relying upon that portion of the issue questionnaire, as well as the additional questions on 
smoking and demographic survey sections. Those relationships may provide support for 
hypotheses one, four, five, and six, and also allow for a basis of comparison between 
data. As indicated in chapter four, four of the five additional questions on smoking gauge 
respondents’ support for different policy approaches towards secondhand smoke, 
including all-out prohibition, alternatives to prohibition, adequacy of the current laws, 
and the repeal of those laws. The remaining question gauges respondents’ perception of 
secondhand smoke exposure as a risk, and is reflected in the table as secondhand smoke 
harms. Smoking frequency, bar patron frequency, political ideology, and party 
identification are all derived from the demographic survey section and remain subject to 
any aforementioned constraints. 
Table IV 
Support for Regulation 
Secondhand 
Smoke 
All-Out 
Prohibition 
Prohibition 
Alternatives 
Current Laws 
Adequate 
Repeal 
Current 
Laws 
 
B
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Smoking 
Frequency 
.406** 
n=284 
.429** 
n=284 
-.045 
n=284 
-.141* 
n=284 
-.136* 
n=284 
Bar Patron 
Frequency 
.374** 
n=284 
.312** 
n=284 
-.062 
n=284 
-.087 
n=284 
-.060 
n=284 
Secondhand 
Smoke 
Harms 
.492** 
n=284 
.420** 
n=284 
.055 
n=284 
-.051 
n=284 
-.254** 
n=284 
Political 
Ideology 
.121* 
n=284 
.146* 
n=284 
-.086 
n=284 
.118* 
n=284 
.113 
n=284 
Party 
Identification 
.204* 
n=211 
.180* 
n=211 
-.054 
n=211 
.179* 
n=211 
.057 
n=211 
* p-value < .025;  ** p-value < .0005 
 
The table indicates several statistically significant relationships that are at least moderate 
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in strength. There is a direct relationship between smoking frequency and the secondhand 
smoke category that is both statistically significant and moderate (r=.406). The same goes 
for the relationship between smoking frequency and the all-out prohibition category 
(r=.429), as well as the relationships between bar patron frequency and both the 
secondhand smoke and all-out prohibition categories (r=.374; r=.312). There is also a 
direct relationship between secondhand smoke harms and both the secondhand smoke 
and all-out prohibition categories (r=.492; r=.420). 
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Chapter 6: Data Analysis 
 
 Given the amount of data obtained from the survey, it’s possible to analyze it 
excessively. Therefore, the following analysis will be confined to the six hypotheses set 
forth in chapter four, along with any pertinent sub-hypotheses that may arise. In each 
instance, the null hypotheses (HO), also known as the opposite of the stated hypothesis 
(alternative hypothesis: HA), will either be rejected or will fail to be rejected. If the 
former is the case, the alternative hypothesis will be accepted. The aforementioned p-
value thresholds of .025 and .0005 are still relied upon for relationship significance, 
without which any null hypothesis must fail to be rejected. 
 
Hypothesis One 
The first hypothesis asserts that the more an individual engages in an unhealthy personal 
behavior, the less likely that individual is to support regulation of that behavior. The null 
hypothesis is, conversely, that an individual is not less likely to support regulation of an 
unhealthy personal behavior the more that individual engages in that behavior. However, 
it must be noted that question type one measures the extent to which the respondents 
indicated they engage in a healthy personal behavior, not an unhealthy behavior. That 
means a direct relationship is necessary to reject the null instead of an inverse 
relationship. As a result, the alternative and null hypotheses are stated in statistical 
notation as follows: 
HA: r > 0 
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HO: r ≤ 0 
 Referring to Table II in chapter five, the overall relationship between healthy 
personal behavior and support for regulation is direct, very significant with a p-value less 
than .001, and moderate in strength with a correlation coefficient of .380. The null 
hypothesis is therefore rejected and the alternative hypothesis is accepted, a conclusion 
that can also be reached when the test is applied to each issue, respectively. The 
relationship between personal behavior and support for regulation of large sugary 
beverages is only significant and weak in strength (r=.177), but every other relationship 
between healthy personal behavior and support for regulation is very significant and 
moderate in strength. Keeping in mind the scope of this study, the data in Table II 
provide substantial support in favor of hypothesis one. 
 Hypothesis one can be examined more thoroughly using the data presented in 
Table IV, which shows the relationship between smoking frequency and support for five 
different smoking policy outcomes. Smoking frequency is measured directionally in 
terms of being healthy as before. The five policy outcome categories include the support 
for regulation metric used in Table II, labeled secondhand smoke, as well as support for 
an all-out prohibition on all indoor or outdoor public smoking, support for an alternative 
to a prohibition on indoor smoking in bars such as a requirement to maintain certain air 
quality levels, support for keeping the laws the same, and support for repealing current 
laws. 
 The relationship between smoking frequency and the secondhand smoke category 
is very significant and moderate in strength (r=.406), leading the null hypothesis to be 
rejected. The same can be said when it comes to the relationship between smoking 
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frequency and support for an all-out prohibition (r=.429). The null hypothesis fails to be 
rejected on both the relationship between smoking frequency and support for prohibition 
alternatives, and the relationship between smoking frequency and support for keeping the 
laws the same. Although the latter relationship is significant, it is weak and inverse (r=-
.141). When it comes to the relationship between smoking frequency and support for 
repealing the current laws, the correlation coefficient must be made into a positive 
number to retain logical consistency. After all, support for repealing the current laws is 
not support for regulation, but opposition to regulation. Once that is done, the null 
hypothesis is rejected. The data in Table IV also provide substantial support for 
hypothesis one, insofar as the unhealthy personal behavior is smoking and the regulation 
is an all-out prohibition. 
 
Hypothesis Two 
The second hypothesis asserts that the more an individual believes that engaging in an 
unhealthy personal behavior is a question of personal liberty, the less likely that 
individual is to support regulation of that behavior. The null hypothesis is, conversely, 
that an individual is not less likely to support regulation of an unhealthy personal 
behavior the more that individual believes that engaging in that behavior is a question of 
personal liberty. Unlike with hypothesis one, an inverse relationship is necessary to reject 
the null of hypothesis two. As a result, the alternative and null hypotheses are stated in 
statistical notation as follows:  
HA: r < 0 
HO: r ≥ 0 
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 Referring to Table II, the overall relationship between views on personal liberty 
and support for regulation is inverse, very significant, and, although moderate in strength, 
is on the cusp of being strong (r=-.696). The null hypothesis is therefore rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis is accepted, a conclusion that can also be reached when the test is 
applied to each issue, respectively. The data in Table II provide substantial support in 
favor of hypothesis two. 
 
Hypothesis Three 
The third hypothesis asserts that the more conscience an individual is of others engaging 
in an unhealthy personal behavior, the more likely that individual is to support regulation 
of that behavior. The null hypothesis is, conversely, that an individual is not more likely 
to support regulation of an unhealthy personal behavior the more conscience that 
individual is of others engaging in that behavior. A significant, direct relationship is 
necessary to reject the null hypothesis. As a result, the alternative and null hypothesis are 
stated in statistical notation as follows: 
HA: r > 0 
HO: r ≤ 0 
 Referring to Table II, the overall relationship between public consciousness and 
support for regulation is direct, very significant, and moderate in strength (r=.520). The 
null hypothesis is therefore rejected and the alternative hypothesis is accepted, a 
conclusion that can also be reached when the test is applied to each issue, respectively. 
The relationship between public consciousness and support for regulation of large sugary 
beverages is only significant and weak in strength (r=.272), but every other relationship 
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between public consciousness and support for regulation is very significant and moderate 
in strength. The data in Table II provide substantial support in favor of hypothesis three. 
 
Hypothesis Four 
The fourth hypothesis asserts that the more liberal an individual is, the more likely that 
individual is to support public health regulations. The null hypothesis is, conversely, that 
an individual is not more likely to support public health regulations the more liberal that 
individual is. A significant, direct relationship is necessary to reject the null hypothesis. 
As a result, the alternative and null hypothesis are stated in statistical notation as follows: 
HA: r > 0 
HO: r ≤ 0 
 Referring to Table II, the overall relationship between political ideology and 
support for regulation is inverse, insignificant, and weak in strength (r=-.060). The null 
hypothesis therefore fails to be rejected and the alternative hypothesis cannot be 
accepted, a conclusion that can also be reached when the test is applied to every issue 
except large sugary beverages, respectively. The relationship between political ideology 
and support for regulation of large sugary beverages is direct, but merely significant and 
weak in strength (r=.160). The data in Table II do not provide substantial support in favor 
of hypothesis four. 
 Hypothesis four can be more thoroughly examined by using the data presented in 
Table III, which measures the relationship between political ideology and support for 
regulation by including only those respondents who identified as either independent or 
other. This could establish stronger relationships between political ideology and support 
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for regulation for those respondents who did not identify with a party than for all 
respondents. Nevertheless, overall and on each issue, the null hypothesis fails to be 
rejected. The data in Table III do not provide substantial support in favor of hypothesis 
four either. 
 The data presented in Table IV might also be of some use. In addition to smoking 
frequency, that table shows the relationship between political ideology and support for 
five different smoking policy outcomes. The relationship between political ideology and 
the secondhand smoke category is significant but weak (r=.121). The same may be said 
for the relationship between political ideology and support for an all-out prohibition 
(r=.146), and political ideology and support for keeping the laws the same (.118). After 
testing each relationship, the null hypothesis is rejected. The data in Table IV provide 
support in favor of hypothesis five, but it is not substantial, especially if applied outside 
the scope of this study. 
 
Hypothesis Five 
The fifth hypothesis asserts that Democrats are more likely to support public health 
regulations. The null hypothesis is, conversely, that Democrats are not more likely to 
support public health regulations. A significant, direct relationship is necessary to reject 
the null hypothesis. As a result, the alternative and null hypothesis are stated in statistical 
notation as follows: 
HA: r > 0 
HO: r ≤ 0 
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 Referring to Table II, the overall relationship between party identification and 
support for regulation is inverse, insignificant, and weak in strength (r=-.030). The null 
hypothesis therefore fails to be rejected and the alternative hypothesis cannot be 
accepted, a conclusion that can also be reached when the test is applied to each issue. 
There is a significant relationship between party identification and support for regulation 
of large sugary beverages, but it is inverse and weak in strength (r=-.180). The data in 
Table II do not provide substantial support in favor of hypothesis five. 
 Hypothesis five can be examined more thoroughly using the data presented in 
Table IV, which shows the relationship between party identification and support for five 
different smoking policy outcomes. The relationship between party identification and the 
secondhand smoke category is significant but weak (r=.204). The same may be said for 
the relationship between political ideology and support for an all-out prohibition 
(r=.180), and political ideology and support for keeping laws the same (r=.179). After 
testing each relationship, the null hypothesis is rejected. The data in Table IV provide 
support in favor of hypothesis five, but it is not substantial, especially if applied outside 
the scope of this study. 
 
Hypothesis Six 
The sixth hypothesis asserts that the less risky an individual perceives secondhand smoke 
to be, the less likely that individual is to support indoor public smoking regulations. The 
null hypothesis is, conversely, that an individual is not less likely to support indoor public 
smoking regulations the less risky that individual perceives secondhand smoke to be. 
Whether secondhand smoke harms is measured directionally, towards believing that it 
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does. A significant, direct relationship is therefore necessary to reject the null hypothesis. 
As a result, the alternative and null hypothesis are stated in statistical notation as follows: 
HA: r > 0 
HO: r ≤ 0 
 Referring to Table IV, the relationship between secondhand smoke harms and the 
secondhand smoke category is very significant and moderate in strength (r=.492). The 
same may be said for the relationship between secondhand smoke harms and support for 
an all-out prohibition (r=.420). In both instances, the null hypothesis is rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis is accepted. When it comes to the very significant yet weak 
relationship between secondhand smoke harms and support for repealing the current laws 
(r=-.254), the correlation coefficient must be made into a positive number to retain 
logical consistency (r=.254). Once that is done, the null hypothesis is rejected there too. 
The data in Table IV provide substantial support in favor of hypothesis six, but only 
insofar as the regulation supported is an all-out prohibition. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
  
 Although the findings will be related forthwith, this study mostly concludes as it 
began—by asking questions. Support for public health regulations is influenced by a 
wide variety of determinants, only six of which have been examined in this study. Even 
then, attempting to measure the relationship between policy stances and just those factors, 
including personal behavior, perception of liberty, public consciousness, political 
ideology, party identification, and risk perception, might have been too ambitious. But 
understanding those relationships definitely was never the object of this study. 
Acknowledging time and again that this study is far too limited in scope for that, its 
object has rather been to spur more pointed scholarly research, and that end may have 
very well been achieved. The data provides ample food for thought and the potential to 
develop each line of inquiry further. Recommendations on how to proceed are included. 
 
Personal Behavior 
So how much influence does personal behavior have on support for public health 
regulations? Is opposition post-hoc justification for personal behavior? According to the 
studies discussed in chapter three, roughly 19% of adults smoke (CDC 2013), 34.9% of 
adults over the age of 20 are obese (Ogden et al. 2014, 806), 24.6% of adults over the age 
of 18 abuse alcohol on a monthly basis (National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and 
Alcoholism 2014), and 15% of vehicle occupants do not wear their seatbelt (NHTSA 
2010b). It is reasonable to assume that at least some people who engage in an unhealthy 
personal behavior want to persist in doing so, and that they would therefore oppose 
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regulations intending to curb that behavior. 
 Hypothesis one asserted that the more an individual engages in an unhealthy 
personal behavior, the less likely that individual is to support regulation of that behavior. 
That hypothesis was accepted. From this study, it can be concluded that policy stances on 
salient issues are influenced by personal behavior. It is recommended that further 
research along this line of inquiry focus on a single public health issue. For example, how 
can particular personal behaviors involved with obesity such as diet and exercise be 
examined in such detail as to isolate vulnerabilities in the opposition’s argument? If 
meaningful public health regulations can be instituted in areas where opposition has yet 
to coalesce, progress can be made. Nevertheless, those areas are few and far between 
when it comes to salient issues, where those opposed to regulation will fight tooth and 
nail for every inch of turf. Should they be compelled to capitulate? That may very well 
depend on the liberty interests involved. 
 
Perception of Liberty 
The debate over personal liberty versus the public health was the impetus for this study. 
Do those who oppose public health regulations do so because of a conflict with the 
individual’s fundamental belief in the importance of personal liberty? Hypothesis two 
asserted that the more an individual believes that engaging in an unhealthy behavior is a 
question of personal liberty, the less likely that individual is to support regulation of that 
behavior. That hypothesis was accepted. Therefore, insofar as personal liberty can be 
conflated with less regulation, the data support the notion that those who oppose public 
health regulations often believe that competent adults should be able to decide for 
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themselves whether or not to engage in an unhealthy personal behavior. 
 Those findings may be somewhat fleeting, however, for as Kammen (1986) 
found, the definition of liberty is both elusive and fluid. Further research along this line 
of inquiry ought to focus on reconciling competing interests that arise under the broad 
definition of liberty asserted by Jefferson (1819) and accepted by many scholars (Fried 
2005). Under that definition, liberty is the right to do whatever one wants up until the 
point at which the right of others to do whatever they want is infringed. But what happens 
when someone’s liberty will be infringed no matter what happens? Whose right takes 
precedence and in what setting? When should government intervene? 
 
Public Consciousness 
Is support for public health regulations a product of public health consciousness? 
Hypothesis three asserted that the more conscience an individual is of others engaging in 
an unhealthy personal behavior, the more likely that individual is to support regulation of 
that behavior. That hypothesis was accepted. Therefore, individuals that expect or 
encourage others to refrain from engaging in unhealthy personal behaviors tend to 
support public health regulations more. Recommendations for further research along this 
line of inquiry include distinguishing between layers of public consciousness, from 
family, friends, acquaintances, to strangers.  
 
Political Ideology 
What role might other explanations play, such as a person’s political ideology? NVP 
(1979) and Feldman (1988) suggest a relationship between policy stances and political 
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ideology. Hypothesis four asserted just that, but that hypothesis was not accepted. 
Perhaps that is due to NVP’s (1979) additional finding that the American electorate is 
ever in flux. Further research along this line of inquiry ought to examine that same 
relationship, except next time political ideology should be measured two-dimensionally 
as suggested by Shafer and Claggett (1995), and Treier and Hillygus (2009). Once a 
suitable experiment is found, it should be repeated over time to compensate for any 
fluctuation in the data. Is there a relationship between policy stances and political 
ideology some of the time and not other parts of the time? If so, why? 
 
Party Identification 
What role might other explanations play, such as a person’s party identification? 
Hypothesis five asserted that Democrats are more likely to support public health 
regulations. That hypothesis was not accepted. Perhaps that is due to the fact that the 
country has become increasingly polarized since the end of the Reagan administration 
(see, e.g., McCarty, Pool, and Rosenthal 2006; Dodson 2010). Although the parties might 
have more influence over diehard members, the parties’ influence on the people might be 
less overall. That the hypothesis was not accepted could also be due to Key’s (1966) 
finding that policy stances are not informed by party identification, but that party 
identification is informed by policy stances. Further research along this line of inquiry 
ought to examine the same relationship between party identification and support for 
public health regulations more thoroughly by expanding the metric for party 
identification beyond the two-party system. If a relationship can be established, the 
experiment ought to be repeated over time to compensate for any fluctuation in party 
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polarization. 
 
Risk Perception 
Could an individual’s opposition merely stem from more subtle factors, such as being 
post-hoc justification for perception of risk? This determinant is probably the least well 
examined by this study. Hypothesis six asserted that the less risky an individual perceives 
secondhand smoke to be, the less likely that individual is to support indoor public 
smoking regulations. That hypothesis was accepted, but only insofar as the regulation 
was an all-out prohibition, meaning alternatives to prohibition might be on the table for 
those who do not perceive secondhand smoke as risky. Further research along this line of 
inquiry ought to examine risk perception of more unhealthy personal behaviors for 
reasons of comparison and include a battery of questions that focus on the seven factors 
discussed by Schmidt (2004). 
- - - - - - - - - - 
Is opposition to public health regulations consistent across different types of regulations 
across the public sphere, or does it vary depending on the issue at hand? According to the 
data, it is generally consistent in terms of personal behavior, perception of liberty, public 
consciousness, and risk perception. However, it is inconsistent on an individual basis. It 
would be interesting to discover why. Do individuals only oppose regulation of the 
unhealthy personal behaviors they engage in, and if so, is personal liberty their argument? 
Do they support regulation of unhealthy personal behaviors they do not engage in, and if 
so, is that irrespective of the personal liberty arguments of others? Questions such as 
those drive at the very heart of the discussion over regulating the public health, and 
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perhaps at the very heart of the American experience. 
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Appendix 
The Survey 
 
Risk and Smoking Survey 
 
My name is Robert Lee and I am an undergraduate at the University of Arkansas in 
Fayetteville. I am conducting research for my undergraduate honor’s thesis on cognitive 
dissonance and secondhand smoke exposure.  I ask that you complete the following 
survey. This interview should take only a few minutes to complete; you are free to 
decline any questions you wish, but your candid answers will be greatly appreciated. 
 
This is a request for completely voluntary participation. Your responses will be recorded 
anonymously and you can be assured that all information collected will be kept 
confidential to the extent allowed by law and University policy. 
   
Thank you in advance for your valuable thoughts and insights contributed to this 
important research project.  If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints with this 
research, please call me at (***) ***-**** or e-mail me at rl001@uark.edu or my thesis 
chair, Bill Schreckhise at schreckw@uark.edu.  You may also contact the University of 
Arkansas Institutional Review Board at (479) 575-4572.                           
 
 
LIKERT QUESTIONAIRRE 
 
We would like to know your thoughts the following topics. Please indicate to what extent 
you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
 
 
SEATBELTS 
 
1. I always wear a seatbelt while in a moving vehicle. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
2. I expect others to wear a seatbelt while in a moving vehicle. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
3. Seatbelt laws are necessary to protect individuals from death and serious injury 
resulting from automobile accidents. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
 Lee 75 
4. The government should stay out of it. Adult drivers and adult passengers should be 
able to decide for themselves whether or not to wear a seatbelt while in a moving vehicle. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
5. Seatbelt laws are an important issue to me. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
 
HAND WASHING 
 
6. I always wash my hands after using the restroom. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
7. I expect others to wash their hands after using the restroom. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
8. Laws requiring employees to wash their hands after using the restroom are necessary 
to prevent the spread of germs in business establishments. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
  
9. The government should stay out of it. Employees should be able to decide for 
themselves when to wash their hands. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
10. Hand washing laws are an important issue to me. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
 
LARGE SUGARY BEVERAGES 
 
11. I always refrain from consuming large sugary beverages. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
12. I encourage others to refrain from consuming large sugary beverages. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
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13. Laws regulating the sale of large sugary beverages are necessary to prevent health 
issues such as diabetes and obesity. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
14. The government should stay out of it. Adults should be able to decide for themselves 
whether or not to consume large sugary beverages. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
15. Laws regulating the sale of large sugary beverage are an important issue to me. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
 
ALCOHOL 
 
16. I refrain from consuming excessive amounts of alcohol. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
17. I encourage others to refrain from consuming excessive amounts of alcohol. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
18. Laws regulating the sale and public consumption of alcohol are necessary to prevent 
drinking and driving, alcoholism, liver disease, and cirrhosis.  
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
19. The government should stay out of it. Adults should be able to decide for themselves 
when and how much alcohol to consume. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
20. Laws regulating the sale and public consumption of alcohol are an important issue to 
me. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
 
 
ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE 
 
21. I only treat illnesses with government approved over-the counter-and doctor 
prescribed medications. 
 Lee 77 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
22. I expect others to only treat illnesses with government approved over-the-counter and 
doctor prescribed medications. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
23. Laws prohibiting the consumption of certain drugs, regardless of their medical value, 
are necessary to prevent afflictions such as drug abuse, addiction, and overdoses. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
24. The government should stay out of it. Adults should be able to decide for themselves 
whether or not to treat illnesses with alternative medicines that are neither government 
approved nor doctor prescribed. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
25. Laws prohibiting the consumption of certain drugs, regardless of their medical value, 
are an important issue to me. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
 
SECONDHAND SMOKE 
 
26. I do not go to bars that allow indoor smoking. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
27. I encourage others not to go to bars that allow indoor smoking. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
28. Laws that prohibit indoor smoking in bars are necessary to prevent health issues such 
as lung cancer and heart disease. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
29. The government should stay out of it. Adults should be able to decide for themselves 
whether or not to go to bars that allow indoor smoking. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
30. Laws that prohibit indoor smoking in bars are an important issue to me. 
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Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
 
ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS 
 
 
Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
 
 
31. I find the argument that exposure to secondhand smoke can have detrimental health 
effects such as lung cancer and heart disease convincing. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
32. I would support a prohibition on all public smoking, indoor or outdoor. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
33. I would support an alternative to a prohibition on indoor smoking in bars such as a 
requirement that those bars maintain a higher level of air quality through ventilation 
systems or other applicable technology. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
34. The current laws regulating indoor public smoking are adequate. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
35. The current laws regulating indoor public smoking should be repealed. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Somewhat Disagree   Neutral   Somewhat Agree   Strongly Agree 
 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
 
36. What is your sex? 
 
Male   Female 
 
37. What is your date of birth? (DD/MM/YY) 
 
______________ 
 
38. What is your major? 
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______________ 
 
39. How do you identify your political affiliation?: 
 
Strong Democrat 
Lean Democrat  
Moderate 
Lean Republican 
Strong Republican 
Independent 
Other 
 
40. How would you identify your political beliefs?: 
 
Very liberal 
Somewhat liberal 
Middle of the road 
Somewhat conservative 
Very conservative 
 
41. Which of the following statements best explains how often you smoke cigarettes? 
 
I usually smoke half a pack of cigarettes or more a day. 
I usually smoke more than five cigarettes a month, but less than a half a pack a day. 
I sometimes smoke, but usually less than five cigarettes a month. 
I have smoked only a cigarette or two in the past. 
I used to smoke cigarettes, but I no longer smoke them. 
I have never smoked cigarettes. 
 
42. If you smoke, which statement best describes when you smoke? 
I only smoke at bars or at parties. 
I usually smoke at bars and parties, but I also sometimes smoke by myself. 
I only smoke by myself. 
 
43. How often do you go to out to bars as a customer? 
I usually go out to bars at least five times a week. 
I usually go out to bars two to four times a week. 
I usually go out to bars about once a week. 
I usually go out to bars less than once a week, but more than once a month. 
I go out to bars a few times a year, but usually it’s less than once a month. 
I go out to bars less than once a year. 
I never go out to bars. 
